Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98d449b005171e52…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: daa0f3fafc29bfd13fef19c8c048b871 SHA-1: 89b68cd995622927d62894013443b1285cef8bf2 SHA-256: 98d449b005171e529e058f8127922f4128f24e828292560047ec22f11c390d69
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and an XFA form, which are commonly used to deliver exploits. A critical heuristic identified the CVE-2010-0188 exploit targeting Adobe Reader's LibTIFF component. This exploit likely facilitates the execution of arbitrary code, enabling the download and execution of further malicious content. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
3ae66d4377be216246ad51a80034b3eb186574101bf1a46d14316df08af8503d
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes