RTF malware analysis — malicious · 98bcb2a98c5347e4

MALICIOUS

RTF

97.4 KB First seen: 2024-10-13

MD5: 904af9fb7e5bee74577f430af1080585 SHA-1: 71b79e6f053b89985d109d81670f2dce172775ae SHA-256: 98bcb2a98c5347e4409349f1605a7883a40a541cffc4aa62bf7c77b5160cdd20

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) via OLE object activation (RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_OBJUPDATE). This is a common technique for delivering second-stage malware. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001c6f.bin` `e8a79955738816792bcafe254ea25f22fc2c51df9bb321351d0bec13c1b84938`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C6F	1948 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.