Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98ba8f834f155808…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

35.3 KB First seen: 2023-02-20
MD5: bb324750f068db86e6bd339984db33b2 SHA-1: 57fc59777c7a40babc7f7e4641a908b35fc064bf SHA-256: 98ba8f834f155808a2a10f08b2289b14a90a56004fdc427b6a33e00a3f336468
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass macro security and execute embedded exploits. The embedded object data is likely a malicious payload or exploit code.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004445.bin
72e0d9645daa87a794617f7398aac53c2260e6b34727016de9dbd5afe261f6d6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4445 1448 bytes