Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98b48eefc8e0447e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 06f6250cb63bcd98cea15376fb3445d1 SHA-1: 13621183de6a796481362078895c4ab356918e18 SHA-256: 98b48eefc8e0447e93cc8672f003ccfb6aa7c39172383400e6a07ab0d6977478
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bf.bin
cc27c1925b0745da18362dae40406640025a191b2fa51988f9f3fb681ba76510
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF 1640 bytes