Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98a758d9ade26525…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

97.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-24
MD5: d5e8a39ad5443e48c2c9e3c8bc32cf67 SHA-1: 64192f5cb30f1cd2e9221a28ad22a6bcafa34907 SHA-256: 98a758d9ade26525e8486800b2dc90cbabea1d1a64991c99caabeaf3e54ee396
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an encrypted Office document identified as an exploit carrier for CVE-2017-0199. It contains a URL that likely points to a remote loader, which would download and execute a second-stage payload. The document's encrypted nature and the exploit technique suggest a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jmcglone.com@192.3.108.11/office/https_u/www.doc

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.