Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98993f43694ab5e0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.3 KB First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: 1f312f9a29f28face95a2c5a41f00d5e SHA-1: 682e908a69933aa0c4d13feca4e05ba17e08b256 SHA-256: 98993f43694ab5e0de62e575f1aa464298072555ff3097ad1b6ab0bc2274b47f
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains OLE object data that is automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to exploit OLE activation mechanisms. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly suggests that embedded OLE objects are being used to trigger malicious code execution. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, limiting the ability to determine the specific payload or family.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e96.bin
055c3083a9fb22e9eb7106da3c7c37dd0d33a94ff808e431fecbcea184ef8529
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E96 1853 bytes