Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98928bc4830b97b6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

167.6 KB Created: 2021-10-26 13:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: ec78bab4320c882ce49cbff22c21595b SHA-1: 5cc71b82fc8d12bc1c0bd2ceeb409dd8f696559d SHA-256: 98928bc4830b97b64d0b7980f8ad9fb76e490baff71aee506661f30878eda15a
69 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OOXML document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file package containing a JAR file. This suggests the document is designed to drop and execute a secondary payload. The embedded artifact is likely the initial stage of a multi-stage attack. Further analysis of the embedded artifact is required to determine the exact nature of the payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
be90df1b82509b9fbb62d9b87b5e9b73ad69a0eec8bd8949aded218c387fd331		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 143872 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
e24eedaedac96cd7d1ad2ac6688722273b636332745adc9430221e825df6dd9b		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 139375 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
3209df53100180d3fe89312ebe14b78fc0627391f1548f8805baee644118fd5e		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5140 bytes

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