Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 987b212fd0b77a12…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.2 KB Created: 2020-07-10 18:45:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: c70c1b0345cfd98e380c1a786993a4a3 SHA-1: dce4bc6b98a6de7a3d62cbe454692486f4736f6a SHA-256: 987b212fd0b77a12d90df13f45b898b14051eeb5fa608dd96de2332afdcd6cb6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a link farm and a redirector to malicious infrastructure, disguised as a Deloitte case study. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. The embedded links are designed to lead users to potentially harmful content, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=deloitte%20case%20study%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.zamdevelopsj.org/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164534/7449164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.voodooandburntrubber.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453449/2927465.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.londonlivefitness.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969514/doruwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.coxevolab.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380733/b435077a189.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.matchmypartytheme.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775651/rujezela_jawabar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.propelexcel.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813558/8841008.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dingogirl.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406614/vanusaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thelaptopblogger.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813782/jusok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://tazoraso.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/37102986056.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://faxonitu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/94189820852.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wesobitid.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/patozizenin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3019/9966/files/28899417639.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/34456372212.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/58097506778.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/liwisubusamepumiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/45366335679.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c62.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C62 4932 bytes
SHA-256: ce02805bd3069d07307a38a664b834722ef6bf4d27c7eeb50b03564bbbb4dc3b
font_01_sfnt_off00007d43.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7D43 10064 bytes
SHA-256: ae7cb79b0205e12eb740526e225170bde5c580b23851634af506fa9373f6fa3c

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