Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 98626367e82640f1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

246.1 KB Created: 2019-09-07 14:31:00 First seen: 2021-06-13
MD5: f57e2ea32940c9fffaabd5648af0b4ee SHA-1: 99edceb17a06330ffa64c34ac51168d922f2e36a SHA-256: 98626367e82640f1522fc503150c56afc0ec9c2c98715536b022c4abb2917b69
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers critical heuristics for CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor FONT record overflow) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation). These vulnerabilities allow for the execution of arbitrary code, indicating a likely exploit delivery mechanism. The presence of an embedded URL, though benign, suggests potential for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0001ed56.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1ED56 37421 bytes
SHA-256: e58683574c5ec02b167fc69c724160eeebc9e9970ef7a313bc6e843906b6e68e

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