Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9841cca728f50d23…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 08edb7e2e79541181e0af859e8bd9d84 SHA-1: f80cf937ee96d926047adc74ae787c5f8bf9a223 SHA-256: 9841cca728f50d23427f64f173044a484f3fa16cb455b254f5bef6a01f95e7e3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve code execution. The `RTF_OBJDATA` firing further confirms the embedding of OLE objects, which is a common delivery mechanism for exploits.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007a.bin
40134b316cddcb139fe10f66651f50a7a0c5aafe1da1949b782150ead09611bf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7A 1954 bytes