Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 982f3e4fc10da72e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.2 KB Created: 2021-02-17 19:40:47 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-18
MD5: b559d88f595102fbc432601f57238bea SHA-1: 3b093e1eb519f1149eb486bb6a3dc1300b548461 SHA-256: 982f3e4fc10da72eb19e3d0d52507dc829874f5070077acd3e69ed4abc545a06
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially malicious content. The presence of embedded URLs and the overall structure indicate an attempt to exploit SEO techniques for malicious distribution, likely as a phishing lure or to download further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/strik?utm_term=ipod+nano+6th+generation+charging+cable PDF link annotation
    • https://nupuwumot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135305030/repomodim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuveravovizopow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969477/b71565c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fovodonote.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740633/3a4945cfeb8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mexubigewexuni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384635/8099341.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pekixutub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453658/xusamojoxa_xewaladegaxi_ritabufesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xejukosaxup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437924/3170352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://idealicaitalia.website/kesubexabojeb5pjv3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wotudopis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134679731/bumovov-jixatuvelisofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reduslim-shop.site/gozeredawelasufexe0pp45.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xukifunizagopo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134013279/4ae73e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://llloooodddd.space/annke_dn81r_firmware_updateml1bt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://instacopyrighthelpteam.com/physics_world_magazine_subscriptionbz8mj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dizavobezovedup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135313146/8837555.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kwini-fini.online/bloomed_gelatin_sheets0kv5u.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bixarina.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069915/8cfd50cd3f2be6e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://feyakast.online/lipid_guideline_updatevhpgh.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pupadidaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873798/pufuluxowuvuxusipor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c36a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC36A 5388 bytes
SHA-256: f61ad3fbf65565853c971f99865b4a11c67de81a43801d86956414c7431d114f
font_01_sfnt_off0000d5b3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD5B3 11740 bytes
SHA-256: 5e1522ed09d779ccc73e08f881296f6dd955b9ef1718c7d62ef2fac80e75c6a0