RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9822889664264cbb

MALICIOUS

RTF

47.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-28

MD5: f69ceb677edfd92ee1cececc01fcfeba SHA-1: 17bd4656d418cbc401230c1aff7620b849533b73 SHA-256: 9822889664264cbb7f1d066f187f73fcc2206b612787883e438472abc38f01c8

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this vulnerability. The `SE_ENABLE_LURE` heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable content, a common tactic for macro-based malware delivery. The primary goal is likely to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000534e.bin` `0870deb89e593ed3a9c2b344ac71f47844fefffe8b510e8f7437d8c288ccc4f4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x534E	1970 bytes

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