Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 981a8d22f631f000…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

746.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-23
MD5: bb3ef10c165da5d222d439b85a5b6933 SHA-1: ab1594706c065b893ab7fc9884c005411a03aa06 SHA-256: 981a8d22f631f0002d741ccef8f825506e64f6f02f12082c6ea302a0f6855dd1
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component of Microsoft Office. This vulnerability is commonly used to deliver malicious payloads. Although VBA macros were present, they contained no executable statements, suggesting the exploit relies solely on the OLE object vulnerability. The file's metadata and the exploit itself point to a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
dd2b0f0c36b4a6b199bc38c6cab7e67398c6996d8d4ac5872c7330260fa76505
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD024D0ACA/OlE10nATIVe 1740 bytes