Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 980e600864ff4e88…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.2 KB
MD5: aca848d28479a372f35d265eb70db7c7 SHA-1: 71ba2afddb5c74effc49e3e61bb15ca4c9d73e22 SHA-256: 980e600864ff4e88497f31dbfedc52dae2009492ac320bab69aab6c93ce87e02
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is specifically indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate and the decoded object data strongly suggest that the file is designed to trigger this exploit, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a5.bin
20db545a05e01090de82db3e32aa6ab00b7a612f373a92e61bae6a4e3e5f8153
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA5 1871 bytes