Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9802c8ecf2405a99…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.16 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 1a695ace216df3bba00509190c04dc97 SHA-1: 3b846b619c3fca1f55d90a4abe22c6af960cebb1 SHA-256: 9802c8ecf2405a995ebc9616b5b7983c7515d20defc15d220460595d475bb6da
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability related to MSXML SAX OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code upon opening, likely as a delivery mechanism for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00121c9f.bin
0b3c69267f833ad44824398018a8f07b56cc23ad0322885aebaf1e489cbba165
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x121C9F 3739 bytes