Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97ee20e9cad32e16…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.25 MB
MD5: 8fb035b813210f0b51e8293eecda7ec1 SHA-1: f25302a50076088a6792ea3afd63850c83a5afcd SHA-256: 97ee20e9cad32e16ee1a6c4607ac0f140e8b0fc1fde5256deab60e4e94f9d1b8
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. This is a common technique for delivering exploits. The default encryption password suggests a potentially unsophisticated or mass-distributed threat. Without a document body or script content, the exact payload and delivery mechanism cannot be determined, but the presence of the Equation Editor OLE object strongly indicates an exploit carrier.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.