Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97e61bfa9e7ff468…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.5 KB Created: 2021-04-15 22:43:35 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-30
MD5: 4ef3b26ccddfb242199e88f90477b359 SHA-1: 39d4170809f3e068229e2a3c63a7bcca1ca7d48a SHA-256: 97e61bfa9e7ff468d3d45b1d47d7a65ec7131f175b3bcd92c6dfbb0a263a0fb2
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to potentially malicious domains disguised as legitimate resources. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs suggest it's designed to redirect users to external sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.mainephilanthropy.org/sites/default/files/lipedoketuparukol.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://grossenbacher.co.nz/en/system/files/avoidance-training-certificates/bekam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.grotekeukens.be/sites/default/files/webform/gmawards2018/84972388600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.osgeurope.com/sites/osg-corporate.dev/files/webform/tafunowusovuna.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.enwidth.com/sites/default/files/webform/resumes/89382212171.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://portal-mysigma.com/system/files/student-proof/woximinel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.newburghgroup.com/sites/default/files/webform/resumes/mogewewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://portal-mysigma.com/system/files/student-proof/47432021317.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spotlight-sites.com/sites/default/files/webform/razodogodipuvubetixem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ambrose.edu/sites/default/files/webform/kepasibadugemefobovabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://russian-ice-spb.ru/sites/default/files/webform/files/77599308563.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/cv9VXjIrmdE/uplcv?utm_term=what+type+of+oil+does+a+2006+dodge+grand+caravan+takePDF link annotation
    • https://printandmail.princeton.edu/system/files/webform/mizol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://printandmail.princeton.edu/system/files/webform/zixulupuritijidegebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.vub.be/sites/vub/files/webform/fazarixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gradfutures.princeton.edu/system/files/webform/xafuzekimizitigemuseli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cf77.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCF77 5872 bytes
SHA-256: bca761f25ec356a476f8c0e3e65858c5f7f8a70f14d96ab814f76795b8102db6
font_01_sfnt_off0000e38d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE38D 10472 bytes
SHA-256: 99b40a74937839719e9e2b081298ee44688d8aa966ef8d134567731c8db0c2cd
font_02_sfnt_off00010696.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10696 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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