RTF malware analysis — malicious · 97df4938eff3cfd9

MALICIOUS

RTF

40.1 KB First seen: 2023-07-25

MD5: b3da431b3d8c5c8680024b81ce71bd85 SHA-1: f411c14e7857e7af445f42f851d6ffdec4a082f7 SHA-256: 97df4938eff3cfd9060bc97c2ca1568f3e4c63f4aae0cdfe264fbabd5a153685

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF file contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of embedded exploits.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000454e.bin` `7ca42dcfc9a0a7ffc6b961940d59c92e887b7c8c9a21b0f69080addf5781f13b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x454E	1680 bytes

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