Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97df25ccc443c450…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.4 KB Created: 2020-10-27 22:58:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: ae234ad8c5e94a2dfc14dcd768f769e8 SHA-1: d694173e41cd4dc11c0ead33a7ff084757f17ad8 SHA-256: 97df25ccc443c45025bbf8222dab14bc66a0ab58f83b4ac0ca4ea981e79793c1
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of embedded links, with one identified as a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are likely part of a link farm designed to direct users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=aasimar+racial+feats+3.5 In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368485/normal_5f90d988a9b87.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369150/normal_5f87e76a5f069.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373241/normal_5f8b992a117c9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384836/normal_5f8c54535d290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383572/normal_5f97c9c314fcc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368235/normal_5f96c96c291d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388619/normal_5f94327602981.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366639/normal_5f8d876f3e2c0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365662/normal_5f8749433f5c3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373016/normal_5f8dc20ea74a4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367668/normal_5f886037697de.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373240/normal_5f8fd02366456.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/55513314-4ba5-4ea3-a938-e15c3537db1b/65101234286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ae027998-dc14-49ff-8841-7b84435ca07a/the_relationship_between_certainty_a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6c17a1b4-fabd-4bf0-ae68-5140573bdb8a/automotive_parts_furniture.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/13223115-1978-4530-a99a-8ccb7bd14a83/rikosoxijofepokiximiko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0487/8984/8229/files/mystery_reader_clues.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/3838/7607/files/93208961765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0501/9084/4084/files/62720239522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wunupalezozerud/how_to_convert_binary_to_hexadecimal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/juvuraguvutoxif/lomekibuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ca2a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCA2A 4908 bytes
SHA-256: 531ac7a1f833aa4c688b83b1535097a8daef74931ba0f36bb9c11a00924ea9ab
font_01_sfnt_off0000dacb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDACB 11748 bytes
SHA-256: 79df34e36facf4da8b3635c9a35f588352ba74ebd762e935b3c014dc136a5414
font_02_sfnt_off000101cf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x101CF 4324 bytes
SHA-256: cd94ef65598b1866d0653cdd88243d989fd81359c0e770c2d3a4858f1c2f6d34

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