Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97ddc6f472bc1073…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.3 KB Created: 2021-03-19 19:08:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 52b59b794f79ae579a6bedcd312824cd SHA-1: ea1eef36523af4309e61c2b11c157af3a10ac8c4 SHA-256: 97ddc6f472bc10739727daf650591f34636325a0fb4302e5c0bbbd7520bf548b
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many of which point to potentially malicious domains, suggesting a link farm or distribution mechanism. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs are indicative of a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://botokaw.ru/strik?utm_term=distress+tolerance+handout+3
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4478703/normal_603fbfa7c5447.pdf
    • http://lifeeuro.info/37215862607r4wof.pdf
    • http://videohost.space/how_to_activate_p_ebt_card_oklahomaaengj.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420930/normal_5fd89b8a3b033.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4473030/normal_6030d9ecbec92.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4480580/normal_60476c857b2a7.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/dosijowikul/hjhiJSa/full_bedroom_furniture_sets_on_sale.pdf
    • http://trychambre.xyz/how_to_pair_xfinity_remote_to_receivergmsi3.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/torazanopuni/cgfDhhz/horizon_classes_mira_road.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4393209/normal_6004838969a14.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4367311/normal_5fece7f838636.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tofigidukug/aejcljj/womekodadewowevuvefikoso.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/geroterunetu/gcXpia3/86688375925.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://35479656-6a94-44d6-ac55-da507c14a2ae.filesusr.com/ugd/d68318_f3c15bb667684a56852a882a1d6cc293.pdf?index=true
    • https://44034db3-6cdd-4729-adf3-7ccd6afcf354.filesusr.com/ugd/9fe9cc_4fe09a613ce446d8a3986df4130dedb6.pdf?index=true
    • https://4c982f7a-b72b-446d-8c7a-5e2d6818c0db.filesusr.com/ugd/519a61_b7592002f7b746a092cef415ba1e481a.pdf?index=true
    • https://13dbc848-c95e-4197-a439-3ae2050b6ee2.filesusr.com/ugd/46bbe5_f70c7eff382e47cfb0fe7fefcd50f71c.pdf?index=true
    • https://c8a164a7-2549-4056-b209-d27d417f800b.filesusr.com/ugd/136d3d_299d381ee5814865829bf9d748f5bf7a.pdf?index=true
    • https://f2203da8-4034-475c-a980-a37079f2cd7f.filesusr.com/ugd/d29026_2c45a34e7b2c40c68df39be1f4c5a6da.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d146.bin
80af5baa971fe67f05933d97af1b51c30515f0008fb063ad7d6dcfb29d6fc97b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD146 5192 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e2ea.bin
c73971e16c2494af49392d5bdadcecb18278f24afef75419c73ab2bad0835176		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2EA 10340 bytes

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