Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97dbf06b0a9484af…

MALICIOUS

PDF

106.5 KB Created: 2021-07-01 00:10:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: a35ec0a6d936b34bfeeec7015b384ac8 SHA-1: c2c65c3333fc689c76f581b750ed43587ececdc8 SHA-256: 97dbf06b0a9484af6335a0a03205e4c6607be9be649e16b084fa17b5c4a204e1
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous links to external resources, many of which point to compromised WordPress sites. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic and the ML classifier's high confidence score indicate a malicious intent to trick the user into downloading further malicious content. The ClamAV detection further supports this assessment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9929

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.redactordecontenidos.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b62bcfb4241---gowogoxi.pdf
    • http://arch-teh.com/pic/userfile/wamufuwurokukuwi.pdf
    • http://snsi.jp/image/news_file/topaf.pdf
    • https://www.cibaospalaser.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/54iacqapcf9t90luf0jopgmo4p/wiwita.pdf
    • https://frennphotography.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e30c9d15df---bowipopepipijopaduf.pdf
    • https://satybharat.com/ci/userfiles/files/rikuzuxoripagerep.pdf
    • http://totaldeliverancecathedralchurch.com/clients/2/22/22dae496a1749ae881e6bee195142b05/File/32217588545.pdf
    • https://eyestech.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2lsakv87hrpl1vcok6lldsl7lb/30868115924.pdf
    • https://noticky.net/akce/fotky/file/14541029533.pdf
    • https://dgaspcsm.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jodikil.pdf
    • http://dogalakustik.com/depo/sayfaresim/file/vikonokixodasik.pdf
    • https://goldengrowers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/559bd5c125027f187ecbb9437e0fdd6b/45257103234.pdf
    • http://www.advancedevents.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba6708e44bc---kavufoxajoxif.pdf
    • http://labonscafe.com/userfiles/wuxosolasijebebafut.pdf
    • http://optimus.org.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c948c1431da---giwovixasujutafupu.pdf
    • http://mcutech.net/upload/2021/06/file/16235264451574518830.pdf
    • https://tecsal.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160769161b536e---17228410875.pdf
    • https://tantecoccole016.it/file/79427281121.pdf
    • https://transcendenceit.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/81867cffcf8e73880b135f3cfa07169b/mumawolujegobikikede.pdf
    • https://www.ciabrini-immobilier.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0r15fvfvrmf8qh5aac11smljiv/birudopanew.pdf
    • http://vienkiemis.lt/app/webroot/uploads/userfiles/files/88861654187.pdf
    • https://lienlacanien.com/img_pages/file/pemosaserusugiwu.pdf
    • http://garageanything.com/js/upload/files/91714942747.pdf
    • http://fabrykakonwersji.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5832d5eeda80843df504c5b51303dfb1/nijefalo.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=guidelines+answers+for+cs+executive+programme
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00013a35.bin
a7f66aa725fef44f828e3c51cd81ba794867f9747eda404020a22e38537030d1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13A35 11356 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000154de.bin
363d4e17353f4a6d74f85d2f793152572678e41b482b72031e361c8114ebbdcf
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x154DE 17412 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00018299.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18299 16792 bytes