Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97c922b51154f9d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.3 KB Created: 2020-10-02 15:01:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: f80d79b023c9d3931847004d6d79848d SHA-1: 0d2154775e1a6280103ef5f139a26f90c367dd36 SHA-256: 97c922b51154f9d2eef21eec03e46665379946793c2af6a0dbdde0d0768ad0ef
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting, and one specific link to a known malicious redirector. This suggests the document is part of a link farm or SEO manipulation scheme, potentially designed to lead users to malicious content or phishing sites. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/pify?keyword=allusion+in+lord+of+the+flies+chapter+1 In PDF document text
    • https://site-1039465.mozfiles.com/files/1039465/poletagajutulokulox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037135.mozfiles.com/files/1037135/mapax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036855.mozfiles.com/files/1036855/gexisin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036798.mozfiles.com/files/1036798/56817070309.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036873.mozfiles.com/files/1036873/kikubakejikabegilibef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037866.mozfiles.com/files/1037866/xujezepukufifotu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039194.mozfiles.com/files/1039194/kusevelatito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037267.mozfiles.com/files/1037267/38493242394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036883.mozfiles.com/files/1036883/gipapozifasem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039413.mozfiles.com/files/1039413/fakeke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dojupij.therintins.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437421/e26c156e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kwitoskiandassociates.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815388/fapuzinevixidasiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/86c67cde-d81d-415c-995b-f1bce7ecd820/kuwoweseforajafeta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d388a35f-c0fd-47d4-a491-4b04bfa04bd5/34643035833.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/230a386f-dd23-467d-a981-8a52c9fcbfb3/49839003966.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/36d008cd-c296-4d1b-a6ab-3ab7b03954c6/59462763248.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/15cb4729-6994-4e1f-b272-4577af287e06/12379332988.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007004.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7004 5284 bytes
SHA-256: 462c33539f31852dd45332c62a425cf20d64603dc06e1c2c122970576a6eb432
font_01_sfnt_off000081fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x81FE 9952 bytes
SHA-256: e6705326f06911523633388c95d0ee94b3ceb56c9e47da099af69228ca46b82b

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