RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 97c179d8eac12309

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

236.0 KB First seen: 2022-06-05

MD5: 94b1c8fcf259729408ba8e9056a86ed7 SHA-1: 9e8a0d0aac69cb73ed9daef0f83579871cfc7143 SHA-256: 97c179d8eac12309969029b617acf0330c3c4d1765d6e7b348bb7d2d7d49c59c

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with one specifically triggering an update action. The presence of 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. The embedded artifacts, identified as objdata files, are likely components of the malicious payload. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object activation suggests an attempt to execute code upon user interaction.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ba4.bin` `5cd749374bf137f4d2803a97d1b5600d0664cfa7f6770f7beb46126e099ad515`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA4	24324 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
`objdata_01_off0000d1e4.bin` `dd004dba58b2c656e3d355d24a17308be9b6544ee8ace220ec7787c93dcaad64`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xD1E4	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off0000e787.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xE787	12297 bytes

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