Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9780dde2830b70b9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: f0da1d32af69eedbd1123476cdaceeba SHA-1: 7ae6b5e887dde1bd537210ffa2c620f890dc8434 SHA-256: 9780dde2830b70b9f5078c8f70678329b04d2e1e24ccf351b773677e7c2f93d3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin
cd8d588183a661aabba37df1d671db0c0ac346e2f499570fa6982503506a8656		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1579 bytes

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