Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 977917689b2a9ba0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

438.2 KB Created: 2018-05-14 09:51:00 First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 295a0900dea6b665725ad3ef62ec7e43 SHA-1: e84c5ce089def66875c6c3d9dfc2f181aa7f67ee SHA-256: 977917689b2a9ba0077380e1c242c419e1ca9f30b8528bc957aa4f5c3b03de40
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and triggers critical vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8759. These exploits are designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run the MSI payload from the unknown URL. The document body content appears to be financial transaction details, potentially used as a lure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://imskolkata.org/journal/journal_doc/alshamcos.msi In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000ae3c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAE3C 15672 bytes
SHA-256: 05a15edfcf83c6a5808104ea534525bb1781cf79d4f2f5d24eb1bcde3bb60815