Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 97696754c8897eaf…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

38.8 KB Created: 2025-07-01 10:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 986f39eb719a818853826bc8ae04acb1 SHA-1: 823ba87e08e44125f328a856eea91c498dc1b110 SHA-256: 97696754c8897eaff3ef129cad7963c70848844d98ed0f4c282ab665afa837ed
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF heuristic indicates that the document imports an external RTF file, which is then processed by OLE object data handlers. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that this imported object is designed to be activated, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. The presence of an embedded URL in the document text further supports a malicious intent, potentially for downloading additional payloads. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 5

  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/Armenia.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/Armenia.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/Armenia.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://opendope.org/xpaths
    • http://opendope.org/conditions
    • http://opendope.org/questions
    • http://opendope.org/components
    • http://opendope.org/SmartArt/DataHierarchy
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/schemaLibrary/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chart
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/chartDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/spreadsheetDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2008/diagram
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliography
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/compatibility
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/lockedCanvas

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003a12.bin
055938bc6b8152207d7e289850b7662256dbf76bf348ad91f2e0635c2d749e5a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A12 31019 bytes
objdata_01_off0001dcbb.bin
9e8b68393d57d3e633893d134c107c3da58d6e56a7e72494dca54b9ee885b5f4		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DCBB 584266 bytes

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