RTF malware analysis — malicious · 976744001d8f9f31

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.1 KB First seen: 2025-09-10

MD5: bd9050e5939c4c075bc3f6f6091a88ed SHA-1: 837a088e2fe0d621c5399a7445654dbf8eb2b151 SHA-256: 976744001d8f9f316ceed384ac698494f21fd758e8f874e06e287d0d7f87ca92

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the OLE object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document. This exploit likely serves as a dropper for a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000017db.bin` `08f3e48a02e3d449c261ead9ba84a3cc5e56f4566237df1fe61c28a9d9737f7c`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x17DB	1923 bytes

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