Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9751b0e5df7dc8df…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.2 KB Created: 2021-06-22 11:01:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0155c3b4dee76c5f35fbce9baf208622 SHA-1: 5386fe29446043fa8dbd0d4e4b7bb6df624d227e SHA-256: 9751b0e5df7dc8df5deb665c762f1ac4e0abc2c8d968026ace4ce6d2ad7dcfe8
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a significant number of links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting an attempt to host and distribute malicious files. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The embedded JavaScript is likely used to facilitate the download or redirection to the malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://1sis.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c263a869a4f---xopogidixonepepugemeku.pdf
    • http://garageanything.com/js/upload/files/ramubi.pdf
    • http://contactconfiance.com/files/files/jikeminava.pdf
    • https://www.xcelsus.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a409c19bdd2---fuwada.pdf
    • https://www.darrellstuckey.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b4435358aff---dapegujisebi.pdf
    • https://www.blackandwhite-salon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/61db8e77bc487e64c76c4869aedb4ec6/81482895716.pdf
    • http://onlinecommerce.bg/uploads/pages/files/mogexupimozewusew.pdf
    • https://elpmarketing.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c3ee48015c5858e33abec3f22bc3e565/13524428454.pdf
    • http://ubest.ru/images/file/81732328923.pdf
    • https://refour.dk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2ac3356ac25fbf813c62976f77493982/sijurijigatu.pdf
    • https://indacphuc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ro4i71pei7fs9ek5eia2fkv5ki/loluvuxu.pdf
    • http://spalovnachemolak.sk/userfiles/file/zitogifowuvebuwowemezugit.pdf
    • http://atek-ent.com/upload/file/68814081360.pdf
    • https://myphi.biz/nbloom/fckuploads/file/71604989991.pdf
    • https://cambodiadriverservice.com/userfiles/file/zofezirafaxatamuxegowam.pdf
    • https://hostingalani.com/calisma2/files/uploads/gegepokolupesalewizosadow.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=catching+fire+book+download
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de3c.bin
771d3917ca243f3b2a8e29f73284477f86b42868f44c9aa14fa9b6e9dac0cb14		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE3C 5308 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f053.bin
988c27227831cb4a938d6f6ae59326012af33fbb1e055c6a27e24e81e77cdeda		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF053 11260 bytes

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