RTF malware analysis — malicious · 973e336a3a0b7e0a

MALICIOUS

RTF

508.0 KB Created: 2019-01-07 23:54:00 First seen: 2020-05-25

MD5: 0f4cf7f9c8dd29eb29e61900cc6d6a2e SHA-1: 92a777d5ff128410e7a6bfe08bf0b6c05348ef9b SHA-256: 973e336a3a0b7e0a4f0596fc5f0e02a0b83817bb350581f4c7bf7f4b81fbdc01

122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object embeddings, with specific rules indicating the presence of package objects and an \objupdate command designed to force OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The embedded object file 'objdata_00_off00000b2c.bin' is the primary artifact of interest.

Heuristics 5

\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE

OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 5 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000a6c.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xA6C	47662 bytes
SHA-256: `ba4163c573f718567c06b7b20f1579d5ff92c566e8e38e7fa389acbb9a3fcc40`

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