Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 971ace36b3417bc4

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.15 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-28

MD5: 61ad6394770be7b35e626ce88fb17344 SHA-1: d1926471557257030b06dc51e619ba6a06b3f2d1 SHA-256: 971ace36b3417bc4c436b369422f4d8061092f80551eb4cfd8ca4fb630b067a6

150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The 'OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR' and 'CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE' heuristics strongly indicate this exploit is present. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the presence of the Equation Editor exploit is sufficient for initial payload delivery.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR

Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ESI) high SC_GETPC_CALL

x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ESI)
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`ole10native_00.bin` `bba92d276b55e52e118802e8cfa2aa66f4f4bd37632d2265ecaefcf47d662bc5`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00634B6B/oLe10NaTIve	1539 bytes

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