Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96ee39df401a47f3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

33.8 KB Created: 2020-08-30 17:30:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 83d199ff0d1b9c4bcbe4cfaab9cbf6d5 SHA-1: fc4370fb0567458b0e249fbd11a44c1d044e24b0 SHA-256: 96ee39df401a47f35efadbae11e8f61035615d853192c4a2e51f0a0f036c0c66
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link, pointing to 'https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=sakarya+f%25C4%25B1rat+fon+m%25C3%25BCzi%25C4%259Fi'. The document body also contains this URL and numerous other links to PDFs hosted on static.usrfiles.com, suggesting a link farm or redirection strategy. The primary malicious intent appears to be directing the user to the ttraff.cc domain.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=sakarya+f%25C4%25B1rat+fon+m%25C3%25BCzi%25C4%259Fi
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_115ae9c193484922906247c9ee7ae7dc.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_7e1b23471f6f4d3e8f2d2802ff2bfa3d.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ce5d00_f02e7d0a1c7d468ba56a735c7e2c1ad1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ed64d2_4a351b63e3334706b23276ea5e990c1a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_5bc0987d876a49da86f1f0a1c43d0539.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3122/2682/files/tofejugikosekukatoxizix.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/zilifevuzumojewod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0465/4576/4510/files/39059670400.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9efea030c12f4ddcbf79c469a37b49f8.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e03b998dd02543e581a86a6f2010f241.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/cf79db_21c7ecfb0fdc45a0979c8e542584d028.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_5f4268ca41754053a2a6a39ffcbcf2ba.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3cb679_333fddb5c300405eb0aa9c54e3473b27.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/74a852_d84625a0917f467b837ded783676624f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b65acf_4019130cf34341949bf2bf74e5b8b0f4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_4256e1a6ffbf4d08a811cea1e5adb1dc.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004517.bin
16221b9e2f6ff02b15f2f23d973194104d88422978a4b60512068572b52c8748		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4517 5404 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005745.bin
24b6c25636b3df0f33117a24881ffef74110964b7b229f7fe6daa5ceecf64b25		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5745 10648 bytes

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