Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96d90ca0e3b0b0ba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.7 KB Created: 2020-08-30 00:33:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ae3a9d356bbc95ff330eac0c18fad56f SHA-1: 9cd299ca600fd9f1c7c741ab0583fcbbfb945e79 SHA-256: 96d90ca0e3b0b0ba2a3abff6ef439d3a09429b2781b3bc1385332fbe79770988
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'ttraff.ru'. Additionally, it exhibits a PDF link farm heuristic, with numerous links pointing to Shopify domains, likely for SEO manipulation or to host further malicious content. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL, suggesting a lure for users to click on it.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=zig+ziglar+performance+planner+pdf+d
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4309/3660/files/cash_flow_statement_full_format.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8255/5300/files/fahrenheit_451_guided_reading_questions_part_3.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2930/7296/files/35536660524.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/2525/3023/files/87657753382.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7218/3703/files/9278657780.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4169/2567/files/61601222618.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c1615c_7e283c638f7e4272b3cf5b36d2ee8643.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_6c9a4291edd34b7989248a117f737fd6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/29c71c_37c8c2ba3c3a4fae908f54e2c4441320.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6026/5117/files/pekovobaboguraji.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5630/8123/files/dogunijuvewilukofiwek.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1504/4263/files/forum._xda-_developers._com_android_hacking.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5575/9011/files/98784236873.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/4891/9450/files/72116704472.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004c12.bin
b004d362cb213402ce29637c8f2fc8f6f0d1b7a5c3c2b0471cc295230f6cd84c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4C12 5304 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005e07.bin
a7ad4d344b4e1a689a682c4979c070eeaec96120871d02626da7ffaf310d0f3e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E07 10864 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.