Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96d2b02b3491b5f9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.2 KB Created: 2020-10-02 10:49:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: fed2f7bb3da0a3b61d09c5965fd794cd SHA-1: ec1f79323136212c525841dd670df68a11f508ef SHA-256: 96d2b02b3491b5f93c23583ba633de2fb6cf88df2955dec9f1ebc4e2cd98628b
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and a known malicious redirector. The primary purpose appears to be to funnel users through a link farm to a malicious site, likely for phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself facilitates the malicious redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/pify?keyword=end+behavior+of+a+function+calculator In PDF document text
    • https://site-1039745.mozfiles.com/files/1039745/52889205180.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.claycountyhistoricalsocietyin.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874183/fojolanubizapo_jusawezusevuzov_furuzatarazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thefuturefoodcenter.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741334/zeram_bapuxi_wugisosibobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ekubcm.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873718/0109d4d07a39bc6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039893.mozfiles.com/files/1039893/8988345353.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038958.mozfiles.com/files/1038958/99687928931.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036764.mozfiles.com/files/1036764/dologugexavoridajetera.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039719.mozfiles.com/files/1039719/fowepenuzofum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037274.mozfiles.com/files/1037274/gufasinidusuriru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ede3a6c-84a7-4065-a3ad-5b4251c1a717/zosaxebanugadude.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f598bf7f-8487-48df-9fd5-49a16431335b/badixerojosu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a2b3763a-e760-4592-bc45-b8d2b1c80900/vabod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9a9d61ff-18f5-4111-8973-9d2df1b5173d/45883228170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005577.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5577 5088 bytes
SHA-256: 59d3ec42479d93b21254211f7f42eca6201a8883eb6f6171861a1e7cdde0a21d
font_01_sfnt_off000066ca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x66CA 9740 bytes
SHA-256: 2dcd0059d02c6a77b60889fc99294f93be103fef587ee1c75cb0956efeef9734

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