RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 96c9a2419e229bd0

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

62.1 KB First seen: 2023-03-07

MD5: 8d074b8561b7bbaa71fd8dba9fceea7a SHA-1: b2ecc0f79937c68157faa4360be5680225f4dbf0 SHA-256: 96c9a2419e229bd026e7b73ad44ae7816d10e8aa3cec41e8de73f89edf430286

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures and trigger the exploit. The embedded OLE object's data is consistent with a known exploit payload.

Heuristics 6

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001c46.bin` `125d4e6afdb78564853a6c5d11aa1ce17d565648d5a76890287416bbed832054`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C46	4661 bytes

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