Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96c25b947b14a5bc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.8 KB Created: 2020-10-03 11:03:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 4afd8fbc8bc2711d47256379029b182f SHA-1: 79d4043e6196c713c92de5e1c76d6dadee3a387f SHA-256: 96c25b947b14a5bcd91779886c458511ad8efb6f57ec726a43589b6a0f650065
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with several pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document appears to be part of a link farm or SEO poisoning campaign, aiming to direct users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=gradient+of+a+curve+worksheet+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1038511.mozfiles.com/files/1038511/nunuren.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036800.mozfiles.com/files/1036800/bawepukafomivagulofer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036659.mozfiles.com/files/1036659/wulutebenegokin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://figalaj.jerostique.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739922/cddd6693d74b1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kedag.palenvilleny.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710634/798cd99.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ehsfluidpower.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636683/9375659.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dupovo.spikemclarrity.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738948/muxujerimimenoga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3e5133a3-1e2a-4b77-8019-8942387d3920/popok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d83286b9-a904-437e-a6d4-ea935271046e/73455139665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0495bf4a-1904-4651-b40e-b8b5b770e954/lutomodududuferevuwulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5e1515da-c9ca-445c-a519-c771d1153b06/milunorikir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3ecb7ab5-cc22-4b07-a755-d15e193b1039/kexologilakotu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1228/2789/files/ditigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1055/5041/files/mivajajowidowoji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005ac9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5AC9 5456 bytes
SHA-256: 350958846e6658cb7609d40aaffd27514d4b4d6082c4556795569a2002f13938
font_01_sfnt_off00006d73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6D73 9628 bytes
SHA-256: 262cb5bf8b3b757ebbd60290011fba2cadc27625254ed9269f815e1ff8528a15

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.