Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9674249aec16eed1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.3 KB Created: 2021-01-09 07:39:05 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: ec1763bc01f86402b3f0692c773a242e SHA-1: 1e3030f3726d7cca319fc65f0de76d3d47b139d3 SHA-256: 9674249aec16eed18e961d994e1bab53df0b63ff5488f27ebabd2f9a25697237
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document functions as a link farm, containing numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains. The document body suggests a lure related to 'Coweta county tax assessor search', aiming to trick users into clicking these links. The presence of a ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' and ML classification strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to redirect users to phishing or malware distribution sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/123?utm_term=coweta+county+tax+assessor+search PDF link annotation
    • https://javagakikidubat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969576/rexemuzinevana_dajoxubip_nazub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guzesunidami.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873942/lowosajukesen-givulatawezibul-kewefizulupo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pubedazemel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134870130/672e9f444879.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xopapukewude.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408664/b55be8ffe17f2c4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406787/normal_5fa1bc3194ed0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412889/normal_5fb95515182be.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xufuluzigi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266078/9558265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jogapemufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134492880/4961447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zikawudewodag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134585044/buwidanoroxarev_semipelol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duzuxaxopukuka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134615532/memeje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454550/normal_5fd2dddd01119.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4422367/normal_5fb267502e813.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://resowijex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134681832/tudiberugune.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jovekus/75700771109.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e020.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE020 5020 bytes
SHA-256: 02ba9938ba122877f42d618e36b8b15542e7d3073a33aee72ee06dae68906ee5
font_01_sfnt_off0000f144.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF144 10888 bytes
SHA-256: 594a781eff885f46a2d5390079c7fd30658e0363d8bfda199b7ff573f3543795

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.