RTF malware analysis — malicious · 967059c927f066a7

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.9 KB First seen: 2024-06-10

MD5: 2d6060a66195cf2a68d79606b5eae8f8 SHA-1: 426a17bf4ec7f5eb61ca038032fdea22ec401379 SHA-256: 967059c927f066a79905cf5a2f99562ca72409238322098e8ac93c905e75a1af

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with data indicative of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive suggests that the embedded object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000103.bin` `2b7c46407f196e247d26ce8d3bdcf71e081fff540f2da4d392e64e9734419ce3`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x103	2161 bytes

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