Malware Insights
The PDF contains a lure for users to click on a link related to "command prompt hacking tutorial pdf". This link, https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=command+prompt+hacking+tutorial+pdf, redirects to malicious infrastructure. The document also contains a large number of external PDF links, many hosted on Shopify, likely for SEO manipulation or to obscure the primary malicious redirector. The heuristic 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' indicates the document may also instruct users to interact with command-line tools, further suggesting a malicious intent to trick the user into executing commands or visiting dangerous sites.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 6
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PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINKPDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
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Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARMSmall PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
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Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINKPDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
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Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LUREDocument tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=command+prompt+hacking+tutorial+pdf In PDF document text
- http://gitimofak.stephmchen.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814930/jaweganajemid.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://zisisena.alexbaltodano.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483281/bonumulu.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://fijewa.debsharratt.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455069/9004224.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://deraxi.trilogyladiesgolfleague.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383629/rasenililekoraj_wejawarimid_garugemodix_rexuzewawomeba.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://files.tofubox.shop/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482997/5257344.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3861/3415/files/66063248279.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9121/3988/files/datuvazukazor.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/2480/0151/files/naruto_classico_download.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7865/5903/files/32019575978.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5011/4967/files/75572503659.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/4126/8647/files/nisimizekuwegukaw.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5765/9547/files/5820841065.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/9945/3608/files/detosigopemos.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3532/8663/files/45360364014.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5652/9557/files/toxosed.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2611/9831/files/60399403288.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7555/9829/files/design_studio_press.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3277/1734/files/48162433438.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8651/9208/files/xevilotizaxotudujenebug.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
font_00_sfnt_off00006ada.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6ADA | 5360 bytes |
SHA-256: aab2700e78e4250b062e0a6a0dad1a6306dccbbeeaa521e446017441c7aa2532 |
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font_01_sfnt_off00007ce3.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7CE3 | 10004 bytes |
SHA-256: eb0d680ec790c56c62bb477f3e798781648936a71426ffd9c46e4a8476160775 |
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