RTF malware analysis — malicious · 965c26393e3b278c

MALICIOUS

RTF

113.3 KB First seen: 2024-07-19

MD5: 6f2f933c81549f01eb55e42a0d85535e SHA-1: f5212e43164146c5015f2091f3f0e69be9909028 SHA-256: 965c26393e3b278c346831c9efc6c344386d1e06fc4f1921c7ce67b0cf0e4a36

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates that the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The `objdata` section contains the embedded object data, which is crucial for the exploit.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001df3.bin` `3f6acfdfa57c2b7f39f72989ef86f7d9b00b2d41851f59db01d89b9b4e3c09c5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DF3	2122 bytes

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