Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9657a326bf80fae3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

247.6 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 029a3bf91c50373d9ef7973d15e1a5e4 SHA-1: b7e33a95374a409c05949c369bdc955fbd34b5b9 SHA-256: 9657a326bf80fae3d6af19a2cfb1bbd3f018fe4cf620b6e53bb487d26f705193
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro that utilizes CreateObject. This indicates an attempt to automatically execute code when the document is opened. The ClamAV detection and heuristic firings strongly suggest this is a downloader malware. No specific URLs or executable payloads were directly extracted, but the presence of VBA macros and the AutoOpen technique are high-confidence indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12213-9918951-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12213-9918951-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b1cec46e9a52c765ba03e2f8e4750462871c4dc690e02d00b4051e6043063923
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2359 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
ec1f29b9d5e80c279d85c41cbdebeebff26d965f23ab5a651d1fde1ac123bd57
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 97280 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.