Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9632fc447937e284…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2021-10-02 11:12:16 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 3c67b91392c769d1b8d1f7e0a087f8ee SHA-1: a7632a4bdd9417aefe9e78bfc61907c546b3cbde SHA-256: 9632fc447937e284c8e8e773ef787648eb3bdba4dff1e62d4f1718167c4945a4
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that references a URL, likely intended to download and execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' firing with 'powershell+if+true+then' suggests the script may attempt to execute commands. The presence of multiple links to PDFs hosted on potentially compromised or disposable domains further supports the malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9840

Heuristics 8

  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.srijonihealinghome.com/fckimages/file/kelomoditeludekum.pdf In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://skybuildinfraprojects.com/uploads/dupajo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chongtham68.com/app/webroot/uploads/files/pufoli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--aknmedical-yub.com/uploads/file/kimewetapafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.absolutecateringla.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136f574b1e61---80458876822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://huangs.tw/uploads/files/202109131611454186.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hosotte.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xopokukanizub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kammerchor-lindau.com/file/57942538949.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shturnev.com/files/foFKED/file/venepugupojoporegukokif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://auburn-properties.com/userfiles/files/50680245389.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fliesen-brill.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614bfa7511172---nalavuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rbc-bezorgdiensten.nl/upload/suzapexiki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cattaneoarchitetti.it/userfiles/files/zikugujofivizigogel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.christinemartin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16157fdca2dffe---repuvenavifuwixap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rw-hse-businessconsulting.de/userfiles/file/50137902355.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dotykbylinky.sk/_subory/subory/63436557126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://azco.friend-match.com/upload/files/58658861114.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ultrabeauty-ff.ru/userfiles/file/jelawugilore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://premiumdrinks.eu/userfiles/duliludekupokureniw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bouwenaaneensterkwerkgeversmerk.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614a262bb7580---24517554940.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arbormaster.net/uploads/files/domubumivasiwajo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quanhoangtsi.com/upload/quangtri/files/32073597174.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://graphicon.hu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614ebb9e9f731---pipafuzonurojuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inclinedigital.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614dcc76b80ab---91190749968.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pokewaveanaheim.com/uploads/files/47461238055.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://christ-china.com/filespath/files/20210907150335.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+if+true+thenPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000118e3.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x118E3 1602 bytes
SHA-256: 4907dd246da46ec223a9c3508201a506f5d7c24f540508b797dd55e08435f683
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Soda PDF'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Xewufefa Jimezaru</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell if true then. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell if true then else. Powershell if not true then. Powershell if then true f</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell if true then. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell if true then else. Powershell if not true then. Powershell if then true f</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell if true then</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Soda PDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-17T09:28:41'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Soda PDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='e7fa3a03-d32b-4349-88bd-4604153af603'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='75686afc-e8f7-4e9d-aca2-4a01a16aa667'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000b431.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB431 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000cc48.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCC48 10336 bytes
SHA-256: 9c9973a60ebabe44d051e29fa1c7f26182dca4c195636e9963df08e26f834d35
font_02_sfnt_off0000e39a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE39A 17748 bytes
SHA-256: 8efe843fa84c982d46adb7e730c4ae36ca504049467d47364f7d3b1e6dff77fc

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