Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96277db97cbb552f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

59.0 KB First seen: 2023-09-07
MD5: f14c4625afb66e9f18e5e155dd0f1da1 SHA-1: 57635d32a193babf701ecddb3e21253d049607f1 SHA-256: 96277db97cbb552fc6a804bd4eb65e71cb6271fd3c3f6a9aca1aaa4c8ec777cc
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF file containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is a common tactic for exploiting such vulnerabilities. The embedded OLE object data is likely the exploit payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002913.bin
f9e25e0667c9b4848a202c7a4849a83de0aff381c1371ad921ded866e8d120c6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2913 2132 bytes