Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9604fbb0d387877e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

54.7 KB
MD5: a3336f2a85c572aab40243c347ebfe59 SHA-1: f6b300530f6d294ea005b13ec08d881c9651f8af SHA-256: 9604fbb0d387877ea857295c8b350e75d5adedc3907bc25f19baf16fff3b0d05
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. The ".\objdata" sections and the \objupdate directive suggest that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of the objdata artifact further supports this conclusion.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000e39.bin
89f23916612693322f32c7e0c37e74f751d7aad045ebb296debdd5688626283e		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE39 1698 bytes

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