Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95eebe3aee67a21a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB First seen: 2021-10-01
MD5: 0d2b55984c139a877edf7da2e50ba1d6 SHA-1: 3f07a5d368baaf66fcd3994edc5a262ae9cec164 SHA-256: 95eebe3aee67a21ae1a73a37612740f589c7c015cad6dd5a6fb73f8c7f05f619
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and activation. The presence of an 'enable lure' suggests the document is designed to prompt the user to enable macros or content, which would then trigger the embedded OLE object. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
e2baee6622e6852c9410f9ec2f210a10476d039371f92b47de924d5fdb294613
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171550 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e29.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E29 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593cc.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593CC 12297 bytes